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 THE LOAN CONTRACT:
 MECHANISM OF FINANCIAL CONTROL*
 Rowena A. Pecchenino
 Industry banking, the style of banking under which a single bank satisfies all
 the external financial needs of an industry, was recognised by Alfred Marshall
 (i9I9) as a positive force in the development of new industries. Today many
 of Marshall's reference industries have reached maturity but their industry
 banks continue to play an active role not only in financing their production and
 expansion, but also in their management (Cable, I985; Prais, 198I). To
 understand the economic impact of industry banking, this paper explores one
 aspect of it: bank directed industry coordination and control.
 Although industry banking is acknowledged as a viable style of banking
 (Cable, I985; Kotz, I978), it has been virtually ignored by banking theorists
 as a framework for the analysis of bank behaviour. Two other perspectives
 dominate the banking literature; the first views a bank as a joint product firm,
 the second views a bank as a Tobinesque portfolio allocator (Baltensperger,
 I980). Neither of these perspectives takes a bank's power as a debt contractor
 into account. This oversight is remedied in Stiglitz and Weiss (I98I) and
 Hester and Pierce (I975), who both analyse ways in which a bank can affect
 the distribution of returns on its loans by altering the ways in which they are
 written. They both emphasise the importance to banks of information about
 their borrowers, but neither consider the possibility of using information about
 one borrower when writing a loan contract for another. Stiglitz (I985) takes
 the analysis one step further in his discussion of how a debt contract can be
 designed to constrain a firm's behaviour effectively, but he does not extend his
 analysis to the case of industry control.
 Industry control is based on a bank's ability to compile information that is
 in general not available to individual firms, and then use that information to
 write behaviour modifying loan contracts. Section II presents a model in which
 a bank writes incentive compatible contracts that elicit and disseminate firm
 specific information which is important to firm decision-making but is not
 revealed by the market. The contracts, which hold the firms to the multiplant
 monopoly level of output, are not breached because of severe penalties specified
 in negative covenants similar to those found in real loan contracts. If certain
 feasibility conditions are satisfied, industry-coordinating contracts can be
 written whether or not firms have internal funds, and will be written so long
 as it is profitable for the bank. The contracts are similar to the principal-agent
 * This paper is an essay from my Ph.D. dissertation. I would like to thank my advisor, Professor Donald
 Hester, for his invaluable assistance, and the comments of C. A. Pissarides, H. Quirmbach, V. Lambsen, the
 seminar participants at the 2eJournees Internationales D'Economie Monetaire et Bancaire, and those of two
 anonymous referees.
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 contracts developed in Demski and Sappington (I984), while the information-
 sharing process closely resembles Gerard-Varet and Moulin's (I 978) cor-
 relating mechanism.
 To provide the theoretical analysis in Section II with an institutional base,
 Section I discusses the economic forces which may lead to a banking industry
 segmented into industry banks. Section III concludes the paper with a brief
 discussion of extensions to and the testable implications of the analysis.
 I. COST OF FINANCING PRODUCTION AND INDUSTRY BANKING
 A firm seeking outside funding for production or expansion can either raise
 money directly on the capital market by issuing equity or debt, or it can take
 out a bank loan. The first method requires the services of an investment banker,
 the second the services of a commercial banker. Both types of banks require a
 firm to disclose detailed information about itself, and so firms needing outside
 funds both today and in the future might choose to use repeatedly the financial
 services of a particular commercial or investment bank to reduce the costs of
 disclosure. Since investment banks charge a fixed, per-issue underwriting fee,
 the average cost of a small issue is high, which may close small or new firms out
 of the capital market and force them into borrowing from commercial banks.
 Large firms might also avoid issuing equity to raise funds, since in widely held
 firms the controlling group might be altered (Cubbin and Leech, I983; Leech,
 I984), or the probability of a successful takeover bid might be increased.
 If firms show a preference for commercial over investment banks, and if the
 returns to specialisation exceed those to diversification, it might be in a bank's
 interest to become an expert in lending to a particular industry. Having
 established itself as an industry expert, a bank may see little competition if the
 fixed cost of gaining expertise serves as a barrier to entry. New and existing
 firms in the industry would go, or return, to the industry bank because of its
 expertise, and other banks would expect loan requests to them from that
 industry to be the expert bank's rejects. Under these circumstances the industry
 bank is in the position to exert control.
 II. LENDING TO AN INDUSTRY WITH STOCHASTIC TECHNOLOGIES
 11. I. The Model
 The model represents a contractual relationship between a bank and a
 duopoly. Three situations are analysed: in the first the firms do not have any
 internal funds and must borrow to finance production, in the second the firms
 have internal funds about which the bank is fully informed, and in the third the
 firms have internal funds about which the bank is uninformed. To concentrate
 on the bank's role as an information broker, assume that all agents can borrow
 and lend without condition from the capital market at an interest rate r.
 The duopolists each maximise expected profits over a single period. A firm's
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 output, y, is a random function of funding, F, yn = 0 q(F), where O1. > o is a
 productivity scaler for firm j in state n, and q' (F) P o for all F > o, q(o) = o.
 To produce output y a firm incurs two types of costs: those relating directly to
 production, C(y), and those relating to financing, rF. A firm j decides how
 much to produce given its information set which includes
 (i) the market interest rate, r,
 (ii) the industry inverse demand function, p(y, 1y2),
 (iii) its productivity 60n, a realisation of the random variable 0' - {0' }N
 which occurs with probability N
 n=1
 and (iv) its unbiased expectations of the other firm's productivity,
 N
 E Ck (^9k
 m=1
 where 6tn and 0k (j, k = I, 2; n, m = i,...I N) are independent for all n, m,
 j * k.
 Assume the firms form conjectures about each other's output, and act in such
 a way that an equilibrium exists. If the firms' only source of external funds is
 the capital market, and they have no internal funds, in equilibrium firm j's
 expected profits are
 E[ir'(0')] (j= I,2). (I)
 Although the duopolists would earn the highest expected profits in the
 collusive equilibrium, they will not collude since neither firm has the incentive
 to reveal truthfully its productivity state to the other firm. For example,
 suppose firm I tells the truth; it cannot force firm 2 to reciprocate and also tell
 the truth; while firm 2 cannot be confident that firm I has not lied. If the firms
 could make binding commitments by posting bonds, they could guarantee that
 their signals were accurate, but such an action is tantamount to explicit
 collusion which is in violation of antitrust statutes.
 Banks provide the duopolists with an alternative means of financing their
 production and a possible means of colluding. If the duopolists choose to
 borrow from banks the only interesting case is that in which they both borrow
 from the same one, since competing banks cannot improve on the market
 solution without colluding. So, suppose both firms decide to borrow from the
 same bank - an expected profit-maximising agent with net worth and enough
 a priori information to carry out the two-plant monopoly expected profit
 maximisation programme.1 (The bank knows, at least, the distribution of both
 firms' productivity scalers, the base production and cost functions, and the
 industry demand function.) If the bank can write state contingent loan
 contracts that are acceptable to the firms and that force the firms to produce
 at the joint maximising level, it can induce collusive behaviour.
 1 The assumption that this information is freely available in the market is not necessary. All that is
 required is that the bank has already undertaken the costly process of gathering the information. After the
 information is collected, the cost is sunk and so may be ignored in the bank's optimisation programme.
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 To determine contractual terms when the firms do not have any internal
 funds, the bank solves
 N N
 maximise E C (P[Y1(O0 I 0m),y2(9 | ) ] [yl ((91 12 0) ?y2 (2 1 09)
 yi(oin |tk) n=l m=l
 (, k 2N) -{C[yl(061 | am)] + C[y (02 1 6in)]}
 - r{fq-1 [yl (61 1162 ]+ q-1 [Y2 (6,2 j 91 ) ]) (2 )
 subject to
 1r(?n E E[nf5(On)] (j = I, 2; n = I,. . ..........., N), (4)
 Y(0)=Y(P) (j = I, 2; n =I ............ ,N), (5)
 IV (O2n) (T(011) + max f Aq-1 [yf?lttk )]m = I, ... ., NJ) (n, I = I, , N), (6)
 where r{ . } is the bank's cost of funds, and q-1 (y) is the level of funding required
 to produce output y.
 In solving (2) the bank determines the optimal output pairs for all
 contingencies. For example, y1(0nl 02 ) is firm I's optimal output when its
 productivity is 01, and firm 2's productivity is 02 . This joint state occurs with
 probability 1 (m. Having determined the output levels, the bank must write
 contracts to make this state contingent production scheme possible and
 profitable. For the contracts to be profitable for the bank they must satisfy con-
 straint (3) by ensuring that expected industry profits, E[lr*(01,02)], exceed
 the sum of the expected contractually determined profits EL7i() ? 7T2 (02)],
 where the! 'A' denotes a contractually set value. To satisfy constraint (4), a
 contract must be acceptable to a firm so state contingent contractual profits,
 ii'(0M), must be at least as large as expected duopoly profits for that state,
 E[ir'(01)]. Since a firm only knows its own productivity state, contractual
 profits for a firm must be contingent on its productivity state alone.
 To guarantee that the correct production plan for the joint state of nature
 is put into effect, the bank must provide incentives so each firm's dominant
 strategy is to reveal truthfully its productivity state. To ensure that a firm
 produces at the level consistent with its loan and its announced productivity
 state, the bank prohibits under- or over-production and, implicitly, capital
 market activity, (5). If a firm claims to be in a high productivity state when it
 is in a low one, it will not be able to produce adequate output. Underproducing
 or borrowing to meet its production goal reveals its misrepresentation of its
 productivity and can be punished. If a firm claims to be in a low productivity
 state when it is in a high one, it could over-produce or lend out the part of the
 loan not required to meet its production goal, but since these actions reveal
 misrepresentation they can be punished. To ensure that firms abide by
 constraint (5), covenants of the contract must specify reported state contingent
 penalties, b(02 ), for under- or over-production or capital market activity. These
 penalties take the form of negative covenants in real loan contracts.2 Finally,
 2 A positive or negative loan covenant details what a borrowing firm must or must not do. For example,
 common negative covenants prohibit a firm from issuing equity or debt over the term of the loan, or from
 wearing out capital too quickly.
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 by constraint (6), a firm's contractual profits if it claims productivity 61,
 fi(O'.), must exceed the maximum it could get if its productivity state were
 O1, fii(Of), and it keeps the part of the loan not required to produce the
 contractually set level of output, max{L\q` [y(O I Ox)], m = i, ..., N} (I=
 I..,N).3
 The contract offered by the bank can now be defined:
 Definition i. A feasible contract is a state-contingent profit level and a
 loan covenant, [ii(O1.); b (O1,)], that satisfies constraints (3)-(6) for allj = I, 2,
 n= i,...,N.
 When a firm accepts a contract, it reveals its productivity state to the bank
 and not to the other firm. Using this information from both firms, the bank acts
 like Gerard-Varet and Moulin's (I978) correlating mechanism by signalling to
 each firm its optimal action; however, unlike the correlating mechanism the
 bank exacts a fee for its services. It does this by setting loans, which tell the firms
 how much to produce, and interest rates, which determine how profits are
 redistributed.
 The question remains whether the bank can write contracts that solve (2)
 and are feasible. Proposition I shows that if feasibility can be established, an
 optimal contracts exists.
 PROPOSITION I. Suppose there are only two productivity states possible for each
 duopolist (N= 2). Then, if a feasible (definition i) contract exists, the bank can offer
 each duopolist a contract that
 (i) constrains the duopolist to reservation (expected duopoly) profits, in the low-
 productivity state,4
 (ii) constrains output to the collusive (full-information, efficient (joint profit
 maximising)) level.
 Proof See Appendix.
 The contracts specify the loan amounts that allow the collusive level of
 output to be produced, the loan covenants that ensure these output targets are
 exactly met, and the interest rates that achieve the agreed upon profit
 sharing.5 The sequence of events is shown in Table i.
 Proposition I holds only if firms do not have any internal funds with which
 to finance production. If firms do have internal funds, the bank's problem must
 be altered to take this into account. Suppose each firm begins period I with
 internal funds P,(j= I,2) and these levels are market information. The
 bank's problem is unaltered, however, under constraint (5), although firms are
 still explicitly prohibited from under- or over-producing, and implicitly
 prohibited from borrowing, they are now implicitly required to lend out all
 their internal funds. Penalties, bVA(O,), are set to ensure that the explicit and
 implicit conditions of the constraints are not violated. The profit constraint,
 (6), is not altered either, since the firm's expected duopoly profits are invariant
 to the source of non-bank funds. (The opportunity cost of a dollar of funding
 3 The general problem of eliciting truthful revelation of inside information is found in many economic
 applications. For example, a similar problem is faced by Meyerson's (I979) arbitrator.
 4 The reservation level of profits is that attained by a duopolist under any set of conjectures that leads to
 an equilibrium. When the bank sets the contract it knows the conjectural method used by the duopolists.
 5 These contracts are very similar to those derived by Demski and Sappington (1984) in a principal-agent
 model. Their contracts prevent shirking; these enforce collusion.
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 Table I
 Beginning of period
 ( I) (2) (3) (4)
 Duopolists receive Bank offers a set of Duopolists select a Bank sets loans and
 productivity loan contracts contract or choose interest rates to
 signals specifying profits not to contract achieve contracted
 and covenants profits
 End of period
 Middle of period
 (5) (6) (7)
 Firms produce at Firms receive Firms repay bank
 bank 'set' level proceeds from sales and if they have
 and/or break a violated a
 loan covenant covenant they
 incur the penalty
 is r whether the firm borrows it from the capital market or uses its own funds.)
 In this case, also, if a feasible contract exists, an optimal contract can be
 written.
 Definition 2. A feasible contract is a state contingent profit level and loan
 covenant, [7T(On); b"1(6n)], that satisfies constraints (3)-(6), for all j= I2,
 n= i,...,N.
 PROPOSITION 2. If the duopolists have internalfunds the levels of which are market
 information, and N= 2, then, if afeasible (Definition 2) contract exists, the bank can
 offer each duopolist a contract that
 (i) constrains the duopolist to reservation profits in the low productivity state,
 (ii) constrains output to the collusive level.6
 If firms have internal funds, the level of which is private information, the
 bank may still be able to write industry-controlling contracts. In this case
 constraint (5) is again unaltered, but although over- and under-production are
 explicitly prohibited, only borrowing is implicitly prohibited. Penalties,
 b"j(0-), are imposed so that constraint (5) is not violated. Constraint (6) is
 revised to take into account the bank's inability to distinguish sources of funds
 ii (Of ) > #i(61) +r max{X\q-1[y(6i I I )], m = I,... N,} (n,I= I)...,N). (6')
 Definition 3. A feasible contract is a state contingent profit level and loan
 covenant, [1iJ(6S); b"l (Ok)], that satisfies constraints (3)-(5), and (6'), for all
 j= I, 2, n = I) ..., N.
 PROPOSITION 3. Suppose that both duopolists have internalfunds the levels of which are
 private information, and N = 2. Then, if a feasible (Definition 3) contract exists, the
 bank can offer each duopolist a contract that
 (i) constrains the duopolist to reservation profits in the low-productivity state,
 (ii) constrains output to the collusive level.7
 6 Since the opportunity cost of funds to the firm is r whether it uses its own funds or borrows from the
 market, the proof of Proposition 2 is identical to the proof of Proposition I.
 7 The method of proof for Proposition 3 is the same as that for Proposition i and is available upon request
 from the author.
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 In this and the preceding case the bank, essentially, agrees to borrow the
 firms' internal funds at the market rate, and then lends all or part of those and
 possibly other funds to the firms so that they can produce at the collusive
 level.
 11.2. Discussion
 In Propositions I-3 contract feasibility depends largely on whether co-
 ordinating the collusive arrangement is expected to be profitable for the bank.
 Profitability depends, in part, on whether the bank has adequate net worth to
 meet the contractual agreement in those states in which joint maximising
 profits are insufficient.8 All else equal, feasibility is least likely if firms have
 internal funds about which the bank is uninformed since the costs of
 maintaining the relationship may be higher, and the conditions under which
 the bank can induce the firms to tell the truth are more restrictive. However,
 the close working relationships between firms and their industry bank make the
 possibility that the bank is totally uninformed about the firms' internal funds
 seem very unlikely.
 The firms in this model are observationally equivalent from the perspective
 of the market, and so any loan contract which differentiates between them
 suggests that credit is being rationed.9 However, using its superior information
 the bank is able to distinguish between the firms and to write state contingent
 contracts which allocate capital efficiently; this is only in a limited sense credit-
 rationing.
 In the contractual arrangements, as described in the proof to Proposition i,
 if a feasible contract exists the bank writes the optimal contract to maximise its
 profits from control by setting firm profit levels at the minimum consistent with
 truth-telling and individual rationality. If feasibility conditions have been
 satisfied, an optimal contract can be written under which the surplus control
 is, for example, shared proportionally. The bank enforces all types of controlling
 contracts in the same fashion by first collecting and then redistributing the
 surplus.
 If bank-directed industry control is feasible, collusion-enforcing contractual
 agreements are possible in banking systems with multiple banks. Suppose there
 are two banks in the system and firm I borrows from bank I and firm 2 borrows
 from bank 2, then there is no reason for the banks to exist since they cannot
 improve on the market. However, if the firms come as a package the banks
 8 The negative carry is the reason a bank requires net worth for all contracts to be feasible. In Holmstrom
 (I982) a similar net worth requirement is mandated for incentive-compatible contracts to be feasible.
 Though in a single-period framework one would expect the bank to renege, I rule out this possibility.
 9 In this model a bank requires a lot of information to be able to write a collusion-inducing surplus-
 extracting contract. In much of the recent literature on credit-market activity such as Stiglitz and Weiss
 (I98I), banks have been assumed to be unable to gather such detailed information. These models best apply
 to consumer lending markets in which loan size is small and credit evaluations which could distinguish good
 and bad risks are too costly to be justified. In the model in this paper loan size is large, and so costly credit
 evaluation is merited. Obviously, if there were costs of extracting the information from the firms, it is possible
 that a bank would choose to stop well short of the perfect information it is costlessly able to elicit in this model.
 However, so long as a bank's information is better than each individual firm's, it may be able to write a
 surplus extracting contract.
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 could divide any surplus derived from control, by, for example, a linear sharing
 rule.'0 This sort of arrangement is analogous to a consortium loan in which the
 lead bank administers the loan and each of the participants share in the
 profits.
 Propositions I-3 can be generalised for N > 2, J > 2, N, J finite. Including
 explicit financing costs (costs of information collection and evaluation for the
 bank, and costs of disclosure for the firms) in the model seems straightforward.
 Intuitively, these extensions are possible since loan contracts between a bank
 and each firm can be made arbitrarily elaborate."
 If the duopolists were risk-averse rather than risk-neutral, in many cases
 controlling-contracts could still be written. The contract would be very similar
 in form to the fixed wage contract of implicit contracting theory (Azariadis,
 I975) in that it would offer a duopolist an own-state component contingent
 fixed-profit contract under which the profit share would be less than that
 required under risk neutrality. Risk aversion on the part of the bank, however,
 could complicate matters greatly and introduce the possibility that a feasible
 contract would not exist.'2
 The most important assumptions of the model are that each firm receives,
 prior to taking its production decision, a perfect own-productivity signal that is
 totally uninformative about its rival's productivity, and that neither can signal
 its productivity because of incentive problems. This inability of firms to
 communicate offers a bank the possibility of effecting industry control.'3 A
 trade association as well as a bank may be capable of being an information
 conduit between firms. However, the imposition of penalties by a trade
 association on member firms for non-cooperative behaviour is more likely to be
 found in violation of antitrust statutes than similar behaviour by banks.'4
 III. CONCLUSION
 The model just discussed has illustrated how, in an economy characterised by
 asymmetric information, a bank through its loan contracts can elicit, evaluate,
 and disseminate information, affect industry output, and provide a mechanism
 by which economic surplus is distributed.'5 The well-constructed debt contract
 rather than the equity share provides the bank with its ability to control. Other
 10 This could be modelled as a super game. If the colluding banks play a trigger strategy and if the
 discount rate is 'right', collusion will always be the dominant strategy.
 " Shavell (I984) points out that if a state of nature is very unlikely, conditions restricting actions in that
 state may not be included in a contract.
 12 A properly modified constraint (3) could be incompatible with constraints (4)-(6).
 13 The passage of time may undermine a bank's influence. If so, industry banks would function in multiple
 capacities by exerting a controlling influence over some industries and by acting as a competitive banker in
 others. From the perspective of an external observer it would be difficult to determine in which industry it
 played which role.
 14 In U.S. antitrust case-history there has been only one case in which a bank has been named as a member
 of a collusive arrangement among non-financial firms (Kotz, 1978). This is because loan contracts and other
 financial contracts do not establish any relationship between participating firms. Such a claim is more
 difficult to substantiate in contractual arrangements between a trade association and its member firms.
 15 The model presented applies to a single-period loan. Pecchenino (I985) presents a multiperiod model
 of bank coordination of industry based on the limit-pricing model developed in Kamien and Schwartz
 (I97I).
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 market imperfections may also create the potential for bank-directed collusion.
 For example, if information is perfect but capital markets are not, because
 banks can borrow more cheaply than firms, a similar contracting relationship
 between banks and firms can be established. For a specific model'6 in which the
 industry is a symmetric duopoly with deterministic costs, it can be shown that
 if a feasible contract (one which does not violate either firm or bank individual
 rationality) exists, an optimal contract under which output is held to the
 industry profit-maximising level and the surplus is divided among the firms and
 the bank can be written. Further, if the bank is constrained by the government
 to make zero profits, an output-maximising contract, if feasible, exists.
 Whether banks actually do control industries is an empirical question.
 Ideally the determination of bank control would be revealed by a bank's loan
 contracts. If, as is suggested by the model, the contracts extended to firms in the
 same industry specify negative covenants which prohibit outside borrowing,
 many uses of internal funds, and the rate at which capital is worn out, and if
 loan interest rates vary positively with firm net revenues prior to loan
 repayment, then industry control may be suspected. Since loan contracts are
 private documents, more indirect indicators of bank coordination might
 necessarily be relied upon. For example, bank-directed industry control might
 be suspected if most firms that are in the same industry and operating in the
 same market borrow from the same bank, or if individual (controlled) firm
 output in an industry producing good x in one market is more variable than
 individual firm output in an industry producing good x in another similar
 market."7 Another possible indicator is bank officials sitting on the boards of
 many firms' in the same industry, or being present at executive committee
 meetings of these same firms. None of these indicators prove bank control of
 industry, but rather suggest it as a possibility.
 Michigan State University
 Date of receipt offinal typescript: July I987
 APPENDIX
 Proof of Proposition i
 Suppose the productivity states are ordered so 01 < 0' (j = I, 2). Consider the
 following contract for duopolist i:
 If the firm's productivity state is low, 0 = 01: [7i(01) ; b(01)].
 16 This model has been developed and is available from the author upon request.
 17 Suppose there are two duopolies, each of which produce good x in different local markets, each of which
 is characterised by the same market inverse demand function. Assume duopoly I is controlled by a banlk
 while duopoly 2 is not, each firm in each industry is either in a high or a low productivity state with equal
 probability, and the firms' shared production technology is constant returns to scale. In duopoly 2 both firms
 always produce. However, in duopoly i, when one firm is in its high productivity state and the other firm
 is in its low productivity state, the productive firm produces the entire industry output while the
 unproductive firm remains idle.
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 If the firm's productivity state is high, 0 = 02: [*T(02); ;(02)
 where
 b(01) max = p [y (O' 1 02) y2 ( 12 1 02)] yl (02 102) _ C[y1 (01 102)
 + r /\q [yl (0 1 02)] ;p[yl (0 1 02), y2 (2 | 01) ] yl (1 1 02)
 - C[ l(oll 02)] +rAq-1 [yl(O1 1 02)I
 b(01) =max {p[yl (01 1 02), y2 (02 1 01)] yl ( 1 02) _ C[y1 (01 1 02)
 + ? -l [yl(1 l 02)] ;p[yl(Ol l o2),y2(02 101)] Yl(61 l 02)
 -C[1(01 1 02)] +rAq-1 [yl(01 | 02)
 I'(01) = E[iT(01)],
 ii (01) = max (E [ir (01) ]; (01) + max {L\q- [yl (01 1 02) ], Lq-1 [yl (01 02)]J}),
 and where Aq-1 is the difference between the loan extended given the firm's
 claimed productivity state and the loan required to produce the contracted
 level of output in the firm's actual productivity state.
 For the duopolist to accept the contract and truthfully reveal its productivity
 state, the following conditions must be satisfied:
 IR A (O1) I E[rT'(01)] (n = I, 2),
 TTI '(01) =y(01) (n = I, 2),
 TT2 la^ (0 ) la f(01l) + max {/\q-1 [yl (ti1 1 02 )], m = I, 2} (1, n = I, 2) .
 The individual rationality (IR) and truth-telling (TTi and TT2) constraints
 are equivalent to constraints (4)-(6) for firm I in problem (2). The penalties
 are set so that misrepresenting one's productivity state is unprofitable.
 b(01) [b(01)] is the penalty imposed if duopolist I claims to be in his low
 (high) productivity state but is revealed to be in his high (low) productivity
 state. The penalties are equal to the maximum profits he could make by these
 misrepresentations regardless of the other firm's productivity state. The
 penalties are adequate to ensure that the truth-telling constraints are satisfied.
 To show y(01) = '(01), suppose firm I is in its low productivity state but claims
 to be in its high productivity state. Then for whatever loan L it receives from
 the bank it must borrow to be able to produce the contracted level of output
 since 0lq(L) < 0lq(L) for all L > o. If the firm borrows it is revealed to have
 misrepresented its productivity state and the penalty b(01) is imposed. If the
 firm does not borrow and then produces less than the contracted level of output
 it again is revealed to have misrepresented its state, and the penalty is again
 imposed. To show y(O1) = '(01), suppose firm I claims to be in its low
 productivity state when it is in its high productivity state. Then for any loan L
 it receives it will have more than enough funds to produce the contracted level
 of output. If it produces more than the contracted amount it is revealed to have
 misrepresented itself and the penalty b(01) is imposed. If it produces the
 contracted level of output and lends out the excess funds it again is revealed to
 have misrepresented its productivity state and the penalty is again imposed.
 However, it is still possible for the firm to claim that it is in its low productivity
 state when it is actually in its high state. It will do this if for any loan L it can
This content downloaded from 149.157.61.163 on Wed, 26 Jul 2017 09:25:08 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 I36 THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL [MARCH
 produce the contracted level of output, earn the contractual profits * (0), and
 have enough loan funds left over, Xq-1, so ii(O1) ?LXq1 7 ii(Ol). For the bank
 to ensure that this action never pays, it must set profits if the firm claims to be
 in productivity state 01 in excess of ii(01) +?Lq-1, where Lq-1 is the highest
 excess loan consistent with the announced productivity of firm i, and either of
 the productivities of firm 2. So to ensure the firm tells the truth the bank
 sets
 Ii(0) = max (E[iT(O1)]; ii( 0) + max{zXq' [y'(O0)], A?q[Yq'1 [yl ( )]})
 this is exactly TT2.
 Duopolist I accepts the contract if
 ii( 0) = ii( 0) +max{Xq-1 [yl(0 102)], Aq-1 [yl(01 1 02)]}
 since this ensures it more than it could earn in the market, and it will be
 indifferent between accepting and rejecting the contract if ii(01) = E[ir(O1)].
 Assume that if it is indifferent it chooses the action preferred by the bank. It is
 the dominant subgame strategy to self-select the contract consistent with its
 perceived productivity state. The optimal contract for duopolist 2 is designed
 in the same fashion.
 If li('02) = E[iT(O2)], (j = I, 2), the bank can hold the firms to expected
 duopoly profits. The contracts allow the bank to set loans (output levels) at the
 unconstrained joint profit maximisation point, and extract all the expected
 (positive) surplus from control. However, if
 ii(02) = fi(0j) +max{Aq-1 [y1(0'1|10)], q-1 [yj(0{1OS)]} (j,k = I,*2, k)
 then the expected surplus the bank is able to extract may not be non-negative.
 If it is not, the bank will not attempt to control the industry.
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